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Comparative advantage, whether driven by technology or factor endowment, is at the core of neoclassical
trade theory. Using tools from the mathematics of complementarity, this paper offers a simple, yet
unifying perspective on the fundamental forces that shape comparative advantage. The main results
characterize sufficient conditions on factor productivity and factor supply to predict patterns of international
specialization in a multi-factor generalization of the Ricardian model to which we refer as an "elementary
neoclassical economy." These conditions, which hold for an arbitrarily large number of countries,
goods, and factors, generalize and extend many results from the previous trade literature. They also









Comparative advantage, whether driven by technology or factor endowment, is at the
core of neoclassical trade theory. Using tools from the mathematics of complementarity,
this paper o⁄ers a simple, yet unifying perspective on the fundamental forces that shape
comparative advantage in economies with an arbitrarily large number of countries, goods,
and factors.
Section 2 o⁄ers a review of some basic de￿nitions and results in the mathematics of
complementarity. Our analysis emphasizes one key property: log-supermodularity. Broadly
speaking, the log-supermodularity of a multivariate function captures the idea that increasing
one variable is relatively more important when the other variables are high. To ￿x ideas,
consider the following statement. Countries with better ￿nancial systems produce relatively
more in sectors with higher ￿nancial requirements. The formal counterpart to this statement
is that aggregate output is log-supermodular in the quality of countries￿￿nancial systems and
the level of sectors￿￿nancial requirements. In a trade context, log-supermodularity provides
a powerful way to conceptualize the relationship between technology, factor endowment, and
international specialization, as we will soon demonstrate.
Section 3 describes our theoretical framework. We develop a multi-factor generalization of
the Ricardian model with an arbitrary number of countries and sectors to which we refer as
an ￿elementary neoclassical economy.￿Factors of production are immobile across countries
and perfectly mobile across sectors. Each country, sector, and factor is associated with a
distinct characteristic denoted ￿, ￿, and !, respectively. For instance, ￿ may capture the
quality of a country￿ s educational system, ￿ the skill intensity of a sector, and ! the number of
years of education of a worker. The two primitives of our model are: (i) factor productivity,
q (!;￿;￿), which may vary across countries and sectors; and (ii) factor supply, f(!;￿),
which may vary across countries. They re￿ ect the two sources of comparative advantage in
a neoclassical environment, technology and factor endowment.
In this paper, we derive three sets of results on the pattern of international specialization.
Section 4 focuses on the case in which only technological di⁄erences are a source of compara-
tive advantage. Formally, we assume that q (!;￿;￿) ￿ h(!)a(￿;￿). Under this restriction,
our general model reduces to a standard Ricardian model. In this environment, we show that
if a(￿;￿) is log-supermodular, then aggregate output Q(￿;￿) is log-supermodular as well.ELEMENTARY THEORY OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 3
Economically speaking, if high-￿ countries are relatively more productive in high-￿ sectors,
then they should produce relatively more in these sectors. This ￿rst result has played an
important, albeit implicit role in many applications and extensions of the Ricardian model.
It is at the heart, for example, of the recent literature on institutions and trade; see e.g. Ace-
moglu, Antras, and Helpman (2007), Costinot (2006), Cuæat and Melitz (2006), Levchenko
(2007), Matsuyama (2005), Nunn (2007), and Vogel (2007). At a formal level, these papers
all share the same fundamental objective: providing micro-theoretical foundations for the
log-supermodularity of factor productivity with respect to countries￿￿institutional quality￿
and sectors￿￿institutional dependence,￿whatever those characteristics may be.
Section 5 analyzes the polar case in which factor productivity varies across countries in
a Hicks-neutral way, q(!;￿;￿) ￿ a(￿)h(!;￿). Hence, only factor endowment di⁄erences
are a source of comparative advantage. This particular version of our model is a simple
generalization of Ru¢ n (1988). In this environment, we show that if f(!;￿) and h(!;￿) are
log-supermodular, then aggregate output Q(￿;￿) also is log-supermodular. The basic logic
is intuitive. On the one hand, high-￿ countries have relatively more high-! factors. On the
other hand, high-! factors are more likely to be employed in high-￿ sectors because they
are relatively more productive in these sectors. This explains why high-￿ countries should
produce relatively more in high-￿ sectors. Like in the Ricardian case, log-supermodularity
provides the mathematical apparatus to make these ￿relatively more￿statements precise.
As we later discuss, this second set of results can be used to establish the robustness of
many qualitative insights from the literature on ￿heterogeneity and trade.￿Whether they
focus on worker heterogeneity or ￿rm heterogeneity ￿ la Melitz (2003), previous insights
typically rely on strong functional forms which guarantee explicit closed form solutions. For
example, Ohnsorge and Tre￿ er (2004) assume that distributions of worker skills are log-
normal, while Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) and Antras and Helpman (2004) assume
that distributions of ￿rm productivity are Pareto. Our results formally show that assuming
the log-supermodularity of f (!;￿) is critical for many of their results, whereas assuming
log-normal and Pareto distributions is not.
Section 6 considers elementary neoclassical economies in which both factor endowment
and technological di⁄erences are sources of comparative advantage. In these economies,
we show that unless strong functional form restrictions are imposed, robust predictions4 ARNAUD COSTINOT
about international specialization can only be derived in the two most extreme sectors. In
general, the log-supermodularity of f(!;￿) and q(!;￿;￿) is not su¢ cient to derive the log-
supermodularity of aggregate output. In the presence of complementarities between factor
and sector characteristics, which are necessary for factor endowments to a⁄ect comparative
advantage, the indirect impact of Ricardian technological di⁄erences on the assignment of
factors to sectors may dominate its direct impact on factor productivity. This is an important
observation which highlights the potential caveats of combining insights from distinct models
without a generalizing framework.
Although we are, to the best of our knowledge, the ￿rst ones to emphasize the role of log-
supermodularity in a trade context, this property has been used previously in many areas
of economics, including auction theory, Milgrom and Weber (1982); monotone comparative
statics under uncertainty, Jewitt (1987) and Athey (2002); and matching, Shimer and Smith
(2000). From a mathematical standpoint, Jewitt (1987) and Athey (2002) are most closely
related to our paper. In particular, the fact that log-supermodularity is preserved by mul-
tiplication and integration is, like in Jewitt (1987) and Athey (2002), at the core of our
analysis.1 In this respect, our contribution is to show that this mathematical property also
has natural and useful applications for international trade.
The theory of comparative advantage presented in this paper is attractive for two rea-
sons. The ￿rst one is that it allows us to consider both sources of comparative advantage,
technology and factor endowment, within a unifying, yet highly tractable framework. This
is important not only for generalizing results from the previous literature, but also because
factor endowment in practice coexist with technology and institutional di⁄erences. Indeed,
they often have the same causes; see e.g. Acemoglu (1998). The second reason is dimen-
sionality. For pedagogical purposes, neoclassical trade theory is usually taught using simple
models with a small number of countries, goods, and factors. The two most celebrated ex-
amples are the Ricardian model￿ with one factor, two goods, and two countries￿ and the
Heckscher-Ohlin model￿ with two factors, two goods, and two countries.2 In these simple
1This close mathematical connection notwithstanding, our results are not about monotone comparative
statics. In this paper, we are interested in the cross-sectional variation of aggregate output within a given
equilibrium, not changes in aggregate output across equilibria. In particular, the fact that all countries face
the same prices within a given free trade equilibrium is crucial for our results.
2Davis (1995) o⁄ers a simple combination of both models with three goods, two factors, and two countries.ELEMENTARY THEORY OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 5
models, di⁄erences in either technology or factor endowments have strong implications for
the pattern of international specialization. Unfortunately, strong results do not generally
survive in environments with higher dimensionality; see e.g. Ethier (1984) and Deardor⁄
(2007). By contrast, our predictions hold for an arbitrarily large number of countries, goods,
and factors. In this respect, our paper is closely related to Deardor⁄ (1980). Compared to
Deardor⁄￿ s (1980) law of comparative advantage, our main results are less general in that we
restrict ourselves to a multi-factor generalization of the Ricardian model under free trade,
but they are stronger in that they apply to any pair of goods and derive from restrictions
on the model￿ s primitives, factor productivity and factor supply, rather than autarky prices.
Finally, we believe that our general approach could also be useful outside international
trade. The basic structure of our model is central to many models with agent heterogeneity.
At the core of these models, there are ￿populations￿of ￿agents￿sorting across ￿occupations.￿
As we argue in our concluding remarks, whatever these categories may refer to in practice,
they often are the formal counterparts to ￿countries,￿￿factors,￿and ￿sectors￿in our theory.
2. Log-Supermodularity
Our analysis emphasizes one particular form of complementarity: log-supermodularity.3
Since this concept is not widely used in the trade literature, we begin with a review of some
basic de￿nitions and results. Topkis (1998) and Athey (2002) o⁄er an excellent overview
and additional references.
2.1. De￿nition. Let X =
Qn
i=1 Xi where each Xi is totally ordered. For any x;x0 2 X, we
say that x ￿ x0 if xi ￿ x0
i for all i = 1;:::;n. We let max(x;x0) be the vector of X whose ith
component is max(xi;x0
i), and min(x;x0) be the vector whose ith component is min(xi;x0
i).
Finally, we denote x￿i the vector x with the ith component removed. With the previous
notations, log-supermodularity can be de￿ned as follows.
De￿nition 1. A function g: X ! R+ is log-supermodular if for all x;x0 2 X, g (max(x;x0))￿
g (min(x;x0)) ￿ g(x) ￿ g(x0).
If g is strictly positive, then g is log-supermodular if and only if lng is supermodular.
This means that if g also is twice di⁄erentiable, then g is log-supermodular in (xi;xj) if
3In the statistics literature, Karlin (1968) refers to log-supermodularity as total positivity of order 2.6 ARNAUD COSTINOT
and only if
@2 lng
@xi@xj ￿ 0. To get more intuition about the form of complementarities that









































Thus, the relative returns to increasing the ￿rst variable, x1, are increasing in the second
variable, x2. This is equivalent to the monotone likelihood ratio property; see Milgrom
(1981). In a trade context, this property may capture the fact that high-x1 countries are
relatively more productive in high-x2 sectors, as in the Ricardian model, or that high-x1
countries are relatively more abundant in high-x2 factors, as in the Heckscher-Ohlin model.
2.2. Results. Most of our analysis builds on the two following results:
Lemma 1. If g;h : X ! R+ are log-supermodular, then gh is log-supermodular.
Lemma 2. Let ￿i be a ￿-￿nite measure on Xi. If g : X ! R+ is log-supermodular and
integrable, then G(x￿i) =
Z
Xi
g (x)d￿i (xi) is log-supermodular.
In other words, log-supermodularity is preserved by multiplication and integration. Lemma
1 directly derives from De￿nition 1. Proofs of Lemma 2 can be found in Lehmann (1955)
for the bivariate case, and Ahlswede and Daykin (1978) and Karlin and Rinott (1980) for
the multivariate case. In the rest of this paper, we assume that, whenever integrals appear,
requirements of integrability and measurability are met.
3. Theoretical Framework
We consider a world economy comprising c = 1;:::;C countries with characteristics ￿c 2 ￿,
s = 1;:::;S goods or sectors with characteristics ￿s 2 ￿, and multiple factors of production
indexed by their characteristics ! 2 ￿, where ￿, ￿, and ￿ are totally ordered sets.4 We let
￿ be a ￿-￿nite measure on ￿. The number of factors in ￿ may be continuous or discrete.
4We could allow for the existence of countries and sectors whose characteristics cannot be ordered. In
this case, our results would simply apply to the subset of countries and sectors with ordered characteristics.
By contrast, our analysis crucially relies on the fact that ￿ is totally ordered.ELEMENTARY THEORY OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 7
Factors of production are immobile across countries and perfectly mobile across sectors.
f(!;￿c) ￿ 0 denotes the inelastic supply of factor ! in country c. Factors of produc-
tion are perfect substitutes within each country and sector, but vary in their productivity










where l(!;￿s;￿c) is the quantity of factor ! allocated to sector s in country c.
At this point, we wish to be clear that our theoretical framework is more general than
a Ricardian model in that it allows multiple factors of production, but less general than
a standard neoclassical model in that it rules out imperfect substitutability between these
factors within each sector. We come back brie￿ y to the relationship between our model and
the Heckscher-Ohlin model in Section 5.
Throughout this paper, we focus on the supply-side of this economy under free trade. Our
goal is to determine how the cross-sectional variation of our two primitives, q(!;￿s;￿c) and
f(!;￿c), a⁄ects the cross-sectional variation of aggregate output, Q(￿s;￿c), taking world
prices p(￿s) > 0 as given. To this end, we follow the dual approach of Dixit and Norman
(1980).














c) for ￿-almost all ! 2 ￿.
According to De￿nition 2, l(￿;￿;￿) is an e¢ cient allocation if it is feasible and it maximizes
the value of national output at given prices in all countries. Since there are constant returns
to scale, a competitive equilibrium with a large number of pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms would
lead to an e¢ cient allocation.
Because of the linearity of aggregate output, e¢ cient allocations are easy to characterize.
Unlike in more general neoclassical models, the marginal return r(!;￿s;￿c) of factor ! in
sector s and country c is independent of the allocation of factors in that sector: r(!;￿s;￿c) =8 ARNAUD COSTINOT
p(￿s)q(!;￿s;￿c).5 As a result, we can solve problem (2) factor-by-factor the same way we
would solve the revenue maximization problem in a simple Ricardian model. In any country c,
almost all factors ! should be employed in the sector(s) where p(￿s)q(!;￿s;￿c) is maximum.
In the rest of this paper, we restrict ourselves to environments where problem (2) admits
a unique solution.
Assumption 0. The solution to the revenue maximization problem (2) is unique for all
c = 1;:::;C and ￿-almost all ! 2 ￿.
By our previous discussion, Assumption 0 requires p(￿s)q(!;￿s;￿c) to be maximized in
a single sector for almost all factors and all countries. Since Assumption 0 plays a crucial
role in our analysis, it is important to understand why and in which circumstances it is more
likely to be satis￿ed.
At a formal level, Assumption 0 is an implicit restriction on the demand side of the
world economy, which requires world consumption to be at a vertex of the world production
possibility frontier. This is illustrated in Figure 1 in the case of an economy with one factor,
two goods, and two countries; or equivalently, two factors, two goods, and one country.
Ceteris paribus, the more vertices there are on the world production possibility frontier, the
milder that restriction on preferences becomes. From an economic standpoint, this means
that Assumption 0 is more likely to be satis￿ed in economies with:
(1) A large number of countries, as in the Ricardian models developed by Becker (1952),
Matsuyama (1996), and Yanagawa (1996);
(2) A large number of factors, as in the trade models with worker heterogeneity developed
by Grossman and Maggi (2000), Grossman (2004), and Ohnsorge and Tre￿ er (2004).
In particular, if there is a continuum of distinct factors in the economy, then Assumption
0 is generically true. Although prices are endogenous objects which may adjust to equalize





. Under this assumption, marginal returns would be given
by r(!;￿s;￿c) = p(￿s)￿(!)Q(￿s;￿c)=l(!;￿s;￿c), which would depend on the price, p(￿s), and exogenous





Figure 1. Uniqueness of the e¢ cient Allocation
marginal returns across sectors, a ￿nite number of prices cannot, in general, equalize the
returns of an in￿nite numbers of factors.6
Throughout this paper, we maintain Assumption 0, which allows us to express aggregate
output under an e¢ cient allocation as follows.
Proposition 1. Suppose that Assumption 0 holds. Then, for all c = 1;:::;C and s = 1;:::;S,
























From now on, we refer to a world economy where Equations (3) and (4) hold as an elementary
neoclassical economy. The rest of our paper o⁄ers su¢ cient conditions to make predictions
on the pattern of international specialization in this environment.
6Finally, note that Assumption 0 also is trivially satis￿ed in Ricardian models with Armington preferences;
see e.g. Acemoglu and Ventura (2002). In those models, since q(!;￿s;￿c) is strictly positive in a single sector,
p(￿s)q(!;￿s;￿c) is maximized in a single sector as well.10 ARNAUD COSTINOT
4. Source of Comparative Advantage (I): Technology
4.1. De￿nition. We ￿rst consider economies in which factor productivity satis￿es
(5) q(!;￿;￿) ￿ h(!)a(￿;￿),
with h(!) > 0 and a(￿;￿) ￿ 0. Equation (5) allows only Ricardian technological di⁄erences
across countries. Since a is a function of ￿ and ￿, some countries may be relatively more
productive in some sectors than others. By contrast, factors may not be relatively more
productive in some sectors than others: if factor !0 is twice as productive as factor ! in a
given sector, then it is twice as productive in all of them.
De￿nition 3. An elementary neoclassical economy is a R-economy if Equation (5) holds.
In a R-economy, there are no ￿real￿di⁄erences across factors of production. If there exists
! 2 ￿ such that r(!;￿s;￿c) > maxs06=s r(!;￿s0;￿c), then r(!0;￿s;￿c) > maxs06=s r(!0;￿s0;￿c)
for all !0 2 ￿. Hence, a R-economy is isomorphic to a standard Ricardian model. In this
environment, Assumption 0 directly implies
￿(￿
s;￿
c) = ￿ or ;.
Since there are no real di⁄erences across factors of production in a R-economy, their marginal
returns are maximized in the same sector. As a result, countries only produce one good.7
Given this restriction, our analysis of the Ricardian model is similar in terms of scope to the
analysis of Jones (1961).8
4.2. Assumption. To make predictions on the pattern of international specialization in a
R-economy, we assume that:
Assumption 1. a(￿;￿) is log-supermodular.
Assumption 1 states that high-￿ countries are relatively more productive in high-￿ sectors.
For any pair of countries, c1 and c2, and goods, s1 and s2, such that ￿c1 ￿ ￿c2, ￿s1 ￿ ￿s2,
7Of course, this stark implication of Assumption 0 will no longer be true in elementary neoclassical
economies with more than one factor of production.
8Section 4.4 brie￿ y discusses how our results generalize to Ricardian environments where countries produce
more than one good.ELEMENTARY THEORY OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 11







This is the standard inequality at the heart of the Ricardian model. The log-supermodularity
of a simply requires that it holds for any ordered pairs of country and sector characteristics.
4.3. Predictions. The main result of this section can be stated as follows.
Theorem 1. In a R-economy, Assumption 1 implies Q(￿;￿) log-supermodular.
The formal proof as well as all subsequent proofs can be found in Appendix A. The
argument is simple. If Q(￿;￿) were not log-supermodular, then one could ￿nd a pair of
countries and sectors such that the marginal returns of factors of production in the low-￿
sector would be: (i) strictly higher in the high-￿ country; and (ii) strictly lower in the low-￿
country. Under free trade, this is precisely what the log-supermodularity of a precludes.
Theorem 1 imposes strong restrictions on the pattern of international specialization. If a
country with characteristic ￿1 specializes in a sector with characteristic ￿1, then a country
with characteristic ￿2 < ￿1 cannot specialize in a sector with characteristic ￿2 > ￿1. In other
words, there must be a ladder of countries such that higher-￿ countries produce higher-￿
goods.
Corollary 1. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds in a R-economy. Then high-￿ countries
specialize in high-￿ sectors.
So far, we have shown that Assumption 1 is su¢ cient to make predictions on the pattern
of international specialization in a R-economy. Conversely, we can show that Assumption 1
cannot be dispensed with if the log-supermodularity of Q is to hold in all R-economies. To see
this, consider a two-sector R-economy. In this environment, if a were not log-supermodular,
then one could ￿nd a high-￿ country in which the marginal returns of factors of production
would be strictly higher in the low-￿ sector and a low-￿ country in which the marginal
returns of factors of production would be strictly higher in the high-￿ sector. Therefore,
the high-￿ country would specialize in the low-￿ sector and the low-￿ country in the high-￿
sector, which would contradict the log-supermodularity of Q.12 ARNAUD COSTINOT
4.4. Relation to the Previous Literature. Making predictions on the pattern of inter-
national specialization in a Ricardian model with a large number of goods and countries is
knowingly di¢ cult. Deardor⁄ (2007) notes that ￿Jones (1961) seems to have done about
as well as one can, showing that an e¢ cient assignment of countries to goods will minimize
the product of their unit labor requirements.￿We have just shown that by imposing the
log-supermodularity of factor productivity across countries and sectors, one can generate
much stronger predictions. The reason is simple. Using our notations and taking logs, Jones




Corollary 1 merely points out that the solution to this assignment problem exhibits positive
assortative matching if lna(￿;￿) is supermodular; see e.g. Becker (1973), Kremer (1993),
and Legros and Newman (2002).
Though we have restricted ourselves in this section to the case where each country only pro-
duces one good, the formal connection between the Ricardian model and assignment models
holds more generally. In Dornbusch et al. (1977), for example, both countries produce a con-
tinuum of goods, but the pattern of international specialization still re￿ ects the optimal as-
signment of goods to countries. Formally, let ￿(￿) ￿ f￿ 2 ￿jl(!;￿;￿) > 0 for some ! 2 ￿g
be the set of goods produced in a country with characteristic ￿. Without Assumption 0, this
set may not be a singleton. However, using the same logic as in Theorem 1, it is easy to show
that if a(￿;￿) is strictly log-supermodular, then ￿(￿) must be increasing in the strong set
order. Put simply, high-￿ countries must specialize in high-￿ sectors, as previously stated in
Corollary 1.
In light of this discussion, it should not be surprising that log-supermodularity has played
an important, albeit implicit role in many applications and extensions of the Ricardian model.
In his ￿Technology Gap￿model of international trade, Krugman (1986) assumes, using our
notations, that labor productivity in country c and sector s is given by a(￿s;￿c) ￿ exp(￿s￿c),
where ￿s is an index of good s￿ s technological intensity and ￿c is a measure of country c￿ s
closeness to the world technological frontier. Since @2 lna
@￿@￿ > 0, this functional form satis￿es
Assumption 1, which is the critical su¢ cient condition for Krugman￿ s (1986) results to hold.
Log-supermodularity also is at the heart of the recent literature on institutions and trade;
see e.g. Acemoglu, Antras, and Helpman (2007), Costinot (2006), Cuæat and Melitz (2006),ELEMENTARY THEORY OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 13
Levchenko (2007), Matsuyama (2005), Nunn (2007), and Vogel (2007). These papers have
shown that cross-country di⁄erences in institutions may give rise to a pattern of comparative
advantage, even in the absence of true technological di⁄erences. Though the aforementioned
papers di⁄er in terms of the institutional characteristics they focus on￿ from credit market
imperfections to rigidities in the labor market￿ they share the same fundamental objective:
providing micro-theoretical foundations for the log-supermodularity of factor productivity
with respect to countries￿￿institutional quality￿ and sectors￿￿institutional dependence,￿
whatever those characteristics may be.
5. Source of Comparative Advantage (II): Factor Endowment
5.1. De￿nition. We now turn to the case where q satis￿es
(6) q(!;￿;￿) ￿ a(￿)h(!;￿),
with a(￿) > 0 and h(!;￿) ￿ 0. Equation (6) allows factor productivity to vary across
countries, but only in a Hicks-neutral way.9 Therefore, there are no Ricardian technological
di⁄erences in this environment.
De￿nition 4. An elementary neoclassical economy is a F-economy if Equation (6) holds.
The key feature of a F-economy is that the set of factors allocated to a given sector is the
same in all countries. Because of free trade and Hicks-neutrality, we have:
(7) ￿(￿
s;￿
















In a F-economy, the assignment function ￿(￿s;￿c) does not vary across countries. Hence,
patterns of international specialization may only arise from cross-country di⁄erences in factor
endowments, f(!;￿c).
5.2. Assumptions. To make predictions on the pattern of international specialization in a
F-economy, we make two assumptions. First, we assume that:
Assumption 2. f (!;￿) is log-supermodular.
9One could easily extend the analysis of this section to the case where q(!;￿;￿) ￿ a(!;￿)h(!;￿). Here,
changes in a(!;￿) are isomorphic to changes in f (!;￿).14 ARNAUD COSTINOT
Assumption 2 states that high-￿ countries are relatively more abundant in high-! factors.
For any pair of countries, c1 and c2, and factors, !1 and !2, such that ￿c1 ￿ ￿c2, !1 ￿ !2,







As previously mentioned, this is equivalent to the assumption that the densities of coun-
tries￿factor endowments, fc (!) ￿ f (!;￿c), can be ranked in terms of monotone likelihood
ratio dominance. Milgrom (1981) o⁄ers many examples of density functions satisfying this
assumption, including the normal (with mean ￿) and the uniform (on [0;￿]).
In addition, we assume that:
Assumption 3. h(!;￿) is log-supermodular.
Assumption 3 states that high-! factors are relatively more productive in high-￿ sectors,
irrespective of the country where they are located. In our model, Assumptions 2 and 3
play the same role as the ordinal assumptions on factor abundance and factor intensity,
respectively, in the two-by-two-by-two Heckscher-Ohlin model.
5.3. Predictions. The main result of this section can be stated as follows.
Theorem 2. In a F-economy, Assumptions 2 and 3 imply Q(￿;￿) log-supermodular.
The proof relies on Lemmas 1 and 2, but the broad logic is intuitive. If h(!;￿) satis￿es
Assumption 3, then high-! factors are assigned to high-￿ sectors under an e¢ cient allocation.
If, in addition, f (!;￿) satis￿es Assumption 2, then a high value of ￿ raises the likelihood of
high values of ! relative to low values of !. This increases the likelihood that a given factor
is allocated to high-￿ sectors, and in turn, the relative output of these sectors. This, in a
nutshell, explains why Q(￿;￿) is log-supermodular.
Now consider a pair of countries, c1 and c2, producing a pair of goods, s1 and s2, with ￿c1 ￿
￿c2 and ￿s1 ￿ ￿s2. Theorem 2 implies Qs1c1=Qs1c2 ￿ Qs2c1=Qs2c2, where Qsc ￿ Q(￿s;￿c).
Still considering the pair of countries, c1 and c2, and applying Theorem 1 to an arbitrary
subset of J goods, we obtain the following Corollary.
Corollary 2. In a F-economy where Assumptions 2 and 3 hold, if two countries produce J
goods, with ￿c1 ￿ ￿c2 and ￿s1 ￿ ::: ￿ ￿sJ, then the high-￿ country tends to specialize in theELEMENTARY THEORY OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 15
high-￿ sectors:
Qs1c1
Qs1c2 ￿ ::: ￿
QsJc1
QsJc2.
In a F-economy, the assignment function e ￿(￿s) is the the same in all countries. As a result,
cross-country di⁄erences in factor endowments are mechanically re￿ ected in their patterns
of specialization. With Hicks-neutral technological di⁄erences around the world, a country
shall produce relatively more￿ compared to other countries￿ in sectors in which a relatively
higher share of its factors selects. Corollary 2 operationalizes that idea by showing that
Assumptions 2 and 3 are su¢ cient to characterize the ￿sectors in which a relatively higher
share of [a country￿ s] factors selects,￿and in turn, the pattern of international specialization.
Compared to standard Heckscher-Ohlin predictions, Corollary 2 is a strong result. Even
with an arbitrarily large number of goods and factors, it o⁄ers predictions on the cross-
sectional variation of aggregate output rather than the factor content of trade. To get
a better sense of where this strong result comes from, consider a Heckscher-Ohlin model
with two factors, K and L, and multiple sectors with di⁄erent factor intensities, (K/L)
s.
Because of constant returns to scale, such a model can always be rearranged as an elementary
neoclassical economy in which ! ￿ (K/L)
s. The key di⁄erence between this model and ours,
however, is that its restrictions are about aggregate endowments of capital and labor, not
the full distribution of (K/L)
s. If there only are two sectors, the two sets of restrictions
are equivalent;10 but with more than two sectors, restrictions on the full distribution are
stronger, and hence, lead to stronger predictions.
Corollary 2 also shows that imperfect competition and product di⁄erentiation, which are
common assumptions in the empirical trade literature, are not necessary to derive ￿smooth￿
predictions about aggregate output in environments with multiple countries, goods, and
factors.
11 In Romalis (2004), for example, similar predictions are derived in an economy with
two factors, two countries, and a continuum of goods because of monopolistic competition
10In the two-sector case, the supply of the two factors, !1 ￿ (K/L)
1 and !2 ￿ (K/L)













(K/L)2￿(K/L)1, respectively. Hence there is a one-to-one mapping






, on the other hand.
11Eaton and Kortum (2002) make a related point in a Ricardian environment, showing that a gravity
equation can be derived under perfect competition in a multi-country-multi-sector economy. The mechanism
emphasized by our model, however, is very di⁄erent. Unlike Eaton and Kortum (2002), it relies on the e¢ cient
assignment of heterogeneous factors across sectors rather than random productivity shocks.16 ARNAUD COSTINOT
and non-factor price equalization. In a F-economy, markets are perfectly competitive and
factor price equalization holds. Yet, the log-supermodularity of h in (!;￿) creates a strong
enough connection between factor and sector characteristics￿ namely, positive assortative
matching￿ to guarantee that countries should produce relatively more in the sectors that
use their abundant factors intensively.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that Assumption 3 only matters indirectly through its
impact on e ￿(￿s). In the proof of Theorem 2, once we have established that high-! factors
are assigned to high-￿ sectors, restrictions on h(!;￿) are irrelevant. Therefore, Assumptions
2 and 3 also imply that aggregate employment, L(￿s;￿c) ￿
R
e ￿(￿s)f(!;￿c)d!, and aggregate
revenues, R(￿s;￿c) ￿
R
e ￿(￿s)r(!;￿s)f(!;￿c)d!, are log-supermodular in a F-economy.
Corollary 3. In a F-economy where Assumptions 2 and 3 hold, if two countries produce J
goods, with ￿c1 ￿ ￿c2 and ￿s1 ￿ ::: ￿ ￿sJ, then aggregate employment and aggregate revenues
follow the same pattern of specialization as aggregate output:
Ls1c1




Rs1c2 ￿ ::: ￿
RsJc1
RsJc2.
Corollary 3 is attractive from an empirical standpoint. In order to test such predictions on
the pattern of international specialization, one is free to use aggregate data on either output,
employment, or revenues. Moreover, our predictions all are ordinal in nature. This means
that one does not need to observe the true country and sector characteristics to confront
them with the data, any monotonic transformation of ￿ and ￿ will do.
5.4. Minimal Su¢ cient Conditions. We have just shown that Assumptions 2 and 3 are
su¢ cient conditions to predict the pattern of international specialization in a F-economy.
This raises one obvious question: Are there weaker properties on f (!;￿c) and h(!;￿s) that
may also lead to the log-supermodularity of Q(￿s;￿c)? The short answer is, like in Section
4, that Assumptions 2 and 3 cannot be dispensed with if one wants to make predictions in
all F-economies. To address that question formally, we follow the strategy of Athey (2002)
and say that:
De￿nition 5. H1 and H2 are a minimal pair of su¢ cient conditions for a given conclusion
C if: (i) C holds whenever H2 does, if and only if H1 holds; and (ii) C holds whenever H1
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De￿nition 5 states that if H1 and H2 are a minimal pair of su¢ cient conditions, then
one cannot weaken either H1 or H2 without imposing further assumptions on the model.
Note that this does not mean that a given conclusion C holds if and only if H1 and H2 are
satis￿ed. It simply means that, without one or the other, the conclusion C may not hold in all
environments. In the next Theorem, we show that the log-supermodularity of f (!;￿c) and
h(!;￿s) are a minimal pair of su¢ cient conditions to predict the the log-supermodularity
of Q(￿s;￿c) in all F-economies.
Theorem 3. In a F-economy, Assumptions 2 and 3 are a minimal pair of su¢ cient condi-
tions for Q(￿s;￿c) to be log-supermodular.
From Theorem 2, we already know that Assumptions 2 and 3 are a pair of su¢ cient
conditions. In order to establish that this pair is minimal, we need to prove the existence of
F-economies in which Assumption 3 (resp. 2) and the log-supermodularity of Q(￿s;￿c) imply
Assumption 2 (resp. 3). First, we construct a F-economy with ￿sector-speci￿c￿factors, i.e.
an economy where high-! factors can only produce in one high-￿ sector. In this environment,
if Q(￿s;￿c) is log-supermodular, then f (!;￿c) automatically is log-supermodular. Second,
we construct a F-economy with ￿country-speci￿c￿factors, i.e. an economy where high-!
factors can only be found in one high-￿ country. Using the same logic, we show that the
log-supermodularity of Q(￿s;￿c) implies the log-supermodularity of h(!;￿s).
5.5. Relation to the Previous Literature. The model presented in this section is a
generalization of the r ￿ n Ricardian model of Ru¢ n (1988) that allows for a continuum of
factors and Hicks-neutral technological di⁄erences. Whereas Ru¢ n (1988) o⁄ers analytical
results in the two-good-two-factor case and the two-good-three-factor-case, our results hold
for an arbitrarily large number of goods and factors. Like in the Ricardian case, imposing
the log-supermodularity of the primitives of our model is crucial to predict the pattern of
international specialization in economies with higher dimensionality.
Ohnsorge and Tre￿ er (2004) have developed an elegant variation of Ru¢ n￿ s (1988) model
with a continuum of workers.12 To derive closed form solutions, they assume that work-
ers￿endowments of human capital are normally distributed and that worker productivity
takes an exponential form. In the working paper version of this paper, Costinot (2007),
12Ohnsorge and Tre￿ er (2007) consider the case of a continuum of goods and workers.18 ARNAUD COSTINOT
we demonstrate that their model can be described as a F-economy. Once the signs of the
cross-derivatives of lnf and lnh have been computed using their functional forms, their re-
sults on the pattern of international specialization￿ Theorem 1 p. 15, Theorem 3 p. 19, and
Theorem 5 p. 27￿ are implications of Corollary 2. By identifying log-supermodularity as
the critical su¢ cient condition for their results to hold, our analysis demonstrates not only
the possibility of their results but also their robustness.
Interestingly, the forces that shape the pattern of international specialization in a F-
economy also play a central role in determining the prevalence of organizational forms in trade
models with ￿rm-level heterogeneity ￿ la Melitz (2003), most notably Helpman et al. (2004)
and Antras and Helpman (2004). The formal relationship between these papers and ours is
discussed in details in Costinot (2007). To map these models into our general framework, one
needs to reinterpret each ￿factor￿as a ￿￿rm￿with productivity !; each ￿country￿as an ￿in-
dustry￿with characteristic ￿; and each ￿sector￿as an ￿organization￿with characteristic ￿.
Then, total sales Q(￿;￿) by ￿rms with a ￿￿-organization￿in a ￿￿-industry￿can be expressed
as Q(￿;￿) =
R
e ￿(￿) h(!;￿)f (!;￿)d! where e ￿(￿) = f! 2 ￿jr(!;￿) > max￿06=￿ r(!;￿0)g.
Under this interpretation, h(!;￿) and r(!;￿) are the sales and pro￿ts of a ￿rm with pro-
ductivity ! and organization ￿; and f (!;￿) is density of productivity levels in sector ￿.13
Like in Theorem 2, the assignment function e ￿(￿) is the same across industries. As a result,
di⁄erences in the distribution of ￿rm productivity are mechanically re￿ ected in the preva-
lence of various organizational forms. This explains why industries with relatively more
productive ￿rms shall have relatively more sales associated with the organization that more
productive ￿rms select, whether it is FDI or vertical integration.14
13The previous models and ours only di⁄er in terms of market structure. In the previous models, monop-
olistic competition implies r(!;￿) 6= p(￿)q(!;￿;￿). In Costinot (2007), we show that our analysis carries
over to that environment if r(!;￿) satis￿es a single crossing property. In a F-economy, the only role of
Assumption 3 is to guarantee that p(￿)q(!;￿;￿) satis￿es a single crossing property for all p(￿).
14Antras and Helpman (2004) also recognize the existence of a connection between the mechanism at
work in their model and Meltiz (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004); see footnote 10 p. 571. However, they
do not discuss the critical assumptions on which this logic depends. Our analysis shows, for example, that
assuming the log-supermodularity of f (!;￿) is critical, whereas assuming Pareto distributions is not.ELEMENTARY THEORY OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 19
6. Multiple Sources of Comparative Advantage
6.1. A simple generalization with factor-augmenting technological di⁄erences.
Before o⁄ering a general analysis of economies with factor endowment and Ricardian tech-
nological di⁄erences, we present a simple generalization of a F-economy that allows for
factor-augmenting technological di⁄erences. Formally, we assume that q satis￿es
(8) q(!;￿;￿) = a(￿)h[! + t(￿);￿],
where ! + t(￿) 2 ￿ for all ! 2 ￿ and ￿ 2 ￿. For example, one can think of ! as the
log of workers￿number of years of education and of t(￿) as a measure of the quality of the
educational system in a given country. If t(￿) ￿ 0, then we are back to the Hicks-neutral case.
But if t(￿) 6= 0, Equation (8) introduces the possibility of technological complementarities
between country and sector characteristics like in a R-economy.
De￿nition 6. An elementary neoclassical economy is a Fa-economy if Equation (8) holds.
Fa-economies are interesting because they o⁄er a simple way to combine factor endow-
ment and Ricardian technological di⁄erences. Formally, Fa-economies are equivalent to F-
economies up to a change of variable, e ! ￿ ! +t(￿). Once endowments have been expressed









where e f(!;￿c) ￿ f [! ￿ t(￿c);￿c] and e ￿(￿s) is given by Equation (7). Therefore, if we
can show that e f (!;￿c) is log-supermodular, then we can still use Theorem 2 to predict the
pattern of international specialization. The next theorem o⁄ers su¢ cient conditions on f
and t that allow us to do so.
Theorem 4. Consider a Fa-economy where Assumptions 2 and 3 hold. If t is increasing
in ￿ and f is strictly positive and log-concave in !, then Q(￿;￿) is log-supermodular.
Like log-supermodularity, log-concavity is satis￿ed by many standard distributions includ-
ing the uniform, normal, and extreme value distributions; see Bergstrom and Bagnoli (2005).
The monotonicity of t and the log-concavity of f guarantee that technological di⁄erences
reinforce the pattern of international specialization driven by factor endowment di⁄erences,
Assumptions 2 and 3. Even in the absence of true cross-country di⁄erences in factor supplies,20 ARNAUD COSTINOT
they imply that high-￿ countries are relatively more abundant, now in e¢ ciency units, in
the high-! factors.15 The pattern of international specialization in a Fa-economy follows.
Finally, note that the previous results are stronger than standard Heckscher-Ohlin pre-
dictions with factor-augmenting productivity di⁄erences; see e.g. Tre￿ er (1993). Like in a
F-economy, our approach leads to predictions on the cross-sectional variation of aggregate
output rather than the factor content of trade.
6.2. General technological di⁄erences. We have just shown that the predictions of Sec-
tions 4 and 5 may extend to an environment with both Ricardian and factor-endowment
sources of comparative advantage, albeit under strong functional form restrictions. We now
turn to the case in which q satis￿es:
Assumption 4. q (!;￿;￿) is log-supermodular.
Assumption 4 is a strict generalization of the assumptions used in R- and F-economies.16
Compared to a R-economy, it allows complementarities between ! and ￿; and compared to
a F-economy, it allows complementarities between ￿ and ￿. Hence, both factor endowment
and technological di⁄erences can, in principle, determine the pattern of international spe-
cialization. The question we want to ask is: Does Assumption 4 put enough structure on
the nature of technological di⁄erences to predict the pattern of international specialization
across all countries and sectors of an elementary neoclassical economy? Perhaps surprisingly,
the answer is no. Under Assumption 4, robust predictions about international specialization
can only be derived in the two most extreme sectors, as we now demonstrate.
15It is worth emphasizing that Theorem 4 crucially relies on the linear relationship between ! and t(￿).
We could, in principle, generalize the nature of factor-augmenting technological di⁄erences by assuming that
q(!;￿s;￿c) = a(￿c)h[t(!;￿c);￿s]. This generalized version of a Fa-economy would still be equivalent to
a F-economy up to a change of variable, but predicting the log-supermodularity of Q would then require
strong regularity conditions on f, as strong as the restrictions on t are weak .
16Strictly speaking, Assumption 4 is not a generalization of the assumptions used in a Fa-economy.
According to Equation (8), if h is log-supermodular and t is increasing, then q is log-supermodular in (!;￿)
and (￿;￿), but not necessariliy log-supermodular in (!;￿). However, as mentioned in Section 6.1, there
exists a change of variable e ! ￿ ! + t(￿) such that a Fa-economy reduces to a F-economy.ELEMENTARY THEORY OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 21
6.2.1. A counter-example. We start by o⁄ering a counter-example in which factor supply
satis￿es Assumption 2, factor productivity satis￿es Assumption 4, and yet aggregate output
is not log-supermodular.
Consider an elementary neoclassical economy comprising two countries with characteristics
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By Equations (10) and (11), Assumptions 4 and 2 are trivially satis￿ed. For any c = 1;2
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c;s the factor whose marginal return is equalized between
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What went wrong? The problem comes from the restrictions (or lack thereof) that As-
sumption 4 imposes on the variations of the assignment function, ￿(￿;￿). In a R-economy,
Equation (5) guarantees that ￿(￿;￿) is either ￿ or ;. In a F-economy, Equation (6) guar-
antees that ￿(￿;￿) is invariant across countries. Here, Equation (10) merely requires that:
(i) 1 > !￿
c;S > ::: > !￿
c;1 > 0 for c = 1;2, by the log-supermodularity of q in (!;￿); and that:

























= (1;2;3;4;5;6).22 ARNAUD COSTINOT
(ii) !￿
1;s > !￿
2;s for s = 1;:::;S ￿ 1, by the log-supermodularity of q in (￿;￿). The latter
condition opens up the possibility for country 2 to produce relatively less in the high-￿ sec-
tors. Though the log-supermodularity of q in (￿;￿) makes identical factors relatively more
productive in the high-￿ sectors in country 2, it also leads to lower-! factors to be assigned in
these sectors under an e¢ cient allocation. Since lower-! factors are relatively less productive
in the high-￿ sectors by the log-supermodularity of q in (!;￿), this indirect e⁄ect tends to
reduce the relative output of high-￿ sectors in country 2. Our counter-example simply o⁄ers
conditions under which the indirect e⁄ect of Ricardian technological di⁄erences on factor









At a formal level, our complementarity approach breaks down because it requires too
strong conditions. In order to predict patterns of specialization using Lemmas 1 and 2,
we now need 1 I￿(￿;￿)(!) to be log-supermodular. Assuming that q is log-supermodular in
(￿;￿) and (!;￿) guarantees that 1 I￿(￿;￿)(!) is log-supermodular in (￿;￿) and (!;￿), as in
R- and F-economies, respectively. Both results are the counterparts of predictions about
the monotonicity of solutions of assignment problems in the monotone comparative statics
literature; see e.g. Topkis (1998). Unfortunately, there is no underlying assignment problem
such that the log-supermodularity of q in (!;￿) implies the log-supermodularity of 1 I￿(￿;￿)(!)
in (!;￿). On the contrary, if q is log-supermodular in (￿;￿) and (!;￿), then 1 I￿(￿;￿)(!) must
be log-submodular in (!;￿). This is what we refer to as the ￿indirect e⁄ect of Ricardian
technological di⁄erences on factor assignment.￿
As a careful reader may have already noticed, our counter-example is based purely on
technological considerations. Although the fact that factor endowment di⁄erences can be a
source of comparative advantage is crucial, our argument does not rely on factor endowment
di⁄erences per se: f (!;￿1) = f (!;￿2) = 1. Instead, it relies on the fact that for factor en-
dowments to be a source of comparative advantage, sectors must vary in their factor intensity,
i.e. q must be log-supermodular in (!;￿). In our counter-example, the log-supermodularity
of q in both (￿;￿) and (!;￿) is the only issue.
6.2.2. Robust predictions. When only one source of comparative advantage is present, The-
orems 1 and 2 show that the log-supermodularity of the primitives of our model implies the
log-supermodularity of aggregate output. These are strong results that apply to all countriesELEMENTARY THEORY OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 23
and all sectors. Theorem 4 o⁄ers similar predictions in the presence of multiple sources of
comparative advantage if additional functional form restrictions are imposed.
The previous counter-example shows, unfortunately, that these strong results do not hold
generally. This is an important observation which highlights the potential caveats of com-
bining insights from distinct models without a generalizing framework. In a R-economy, if
high-￿ countries are relatively more productive in high-￿ sectors, then they produce rela-
tively more in these sectors. In a F-economy, if high-￿ countries are relatively more abundant
in high-! factors and high-! factors are relatively more productive in high-￿ sectors, then
the same pattern of international specialization arises. In our counter-example, these as-
sumptions on technology and factor endowments all are satis￿ed, yet high-￿ countries do
not produce relatively more in all high-￿ sectors.18
Our last theorem o⁄ers weaker, but robust predictions on the cross-sectional variation of
aggregate output in this general environment.
Theorem 5. Let ￿ ￿ min1￿s￿S ￿s and ￿ ￿ max1￿s￿S ￿s. In an elementary neoclassical
economy, Assumptions 2 and 4 imply Q(￿;￿c1)Q(￿;￿c2) ￿ Q(￿;￿c2)Q(￿;￿c1) for any pair
of countries such that ￿c1 ￿ ￿c2.
According to Theorem 5, if both factor endowment and technological di⁄erences are
sources of comparative advantage, the pattern of international specialization is unambigu-
ous only in the two most extreme sectors. The formal argument combines the main ideas of
Theorems 1 and 2. Holding the assignment function ￿(￿;￿) constant across countries, the
log-supermodularity of f and q implies that high-￿ countries produce relatively more in the
high-￿ sectors, as in a F-economy. Since q is log-supermodular in ￿ and ￿, the cross-country
variation in ￿(￿;￿) then reinforces this e⁄ect in the two most extreme sectors. As in a
R-economy, a given factor ! is more likely to be found in high-￿ sectors in high-￿ countries.
This implies that a given sector ￿ is more likely to be assigned low-! factors in high-￿ coun-
tries, and in turn, that ￿(￿;￿c2) ￿ ￿(￿;￿c1) and ￿(￿;￿c1) ￿ ￿(￿;￿c2). In other words,
Ricardian technological di⁄erences necessarily lead to more factors in the highest-￿ sector in
high-￿ countries and more factors in the lowest-￿ sector in low-￿ countries, thereby strength-
ening the pattern of international specialization driven by factor endowment di⁄erences.
18In addition, the previous counter-example shows that assuming q (!;￿;￿) ￿ h(!;￿)a(￿;￿) with h and
a log-supermodular is not su¢ cient either to derive the log-supermodularity of Q.24 ARNAUD COSTINOT
Our ￿nal result is reminiscent of the Rybczynski results derived by Jones and Scheinkman
(1977) in a standard neoclassical model with an arbitrary number of goods and factors.
They show, among other things, that if factor prices are constant across countries, as in our
model, then an increase in the endowment of one factor must decrease output in one sector
and increase output more than proportionally in another sector. An important di⁄erence
between this result and ours is that Theorem 5 clearly identi￿es the two most extreme sectors
as those being a⁄ected by changes in factor endowments.19
7. Concluding Remarks
The present paper has developed an elementary theory of comparative advantage. Our
theory emphasizes an intimate relationship between log-supermodularity and comparative
advantage, whether driven by technology or factor endowment. If factor productivity and/or
factor supply are log-supermodular, then many sharp predictions on the pattern of inter-
national specialization can be derived in economies with an arbitrarily large number of
countries, goods, and factors.
While we have focused on the determinants of international specialization, we believe that
our general results could also be useful outside international trade. The basic structure of our
model￿ Equations (3) and (4)￿ is central to many models with agent heterogeneity. These
models may focus on di⁄erent aggregate variables and di⁄erent market structures. But at
the core, there are ￿agents￿with characteristics !; these agents belong to ￿populations￿with
density f(!;￿); and they sort into ￿occupations￿with characteristics ￿ based on their returns
r(!;￿;￿). In public ￿nance, agents may be taxpayers with di⁄erent income sorting across
di⁄erent cities; in corporate ￿nance, agents may be ￿rms with di⁄erent productivity choosing
di⁄erent ￿nancial instruments; in development economics, agents may be individuals with
di⁄erent wealth choosing whether or not to become an entrepreneur; in labor economics,
agents may be migrants with di⁄erent levels of education sorting across destinations; and in
organization economics, agents may be workers with di⁄erent skills sorting across di⁄erent
19Theorem 5 also is related, though less closely, to recent work by Zhu and Tre￿ er (2005), Costinot
and Komunjer (2007), Chor (2008), and Morow (2008). For empirical purposes, the previous papers derive
predictions on the pattern of international specialization in economies with Ricardian di⁄erences and multiple
factors of productions. These predictions, however, are based on assumptions on factor prices, rather than
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layers of a hierarchy.20 In any of these circumstances, our analysis demonstrates that log-
supermodularity potentially has important implications for the cross-sectional variation of
aggregate variables across populations and occupations.
20See e.g. Epple and Romer (1991), Champonnois (2006), Banerjee and Newman (1993), Grogger and
Hanson (2008), and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), respectively.26 ARNAUD COSTINOT
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. We proceed by contradiction. Consider ￿ ￿ ￿0 and ￿ ￿ ￿0. Suppose
that Q(￿0;￿)Q(￿;￿0) > Q(￿;￿)Q(￿0;￿0). This implies Q(￿0;￿) > 0 and Q(￿;￿0) > 0
with ￿ 6= ￿0 and ￿ 6= ￿0. Since Q(￿0;￿) > 0, Equations (3) and (4) further imply the
existence of ! 2 ￿ such that r(!;￿0;￿) > r(!;￿;￿). Using Equation (5), we can simplify
the previous inequality into p(￿0)a(￿0;￿) > p(￿)a(￿;￿). Since Q(￿;￿0) > 0, a similar
reasoning implies p(￿)a(￿;￿0) > p(￿0)a(￿0;￿0). Combining the previous inequalities, we
obtain a(￿0;￿)a(￿;￿0) > a(￿;￿)a(￿0;￿0), which contradicts Assumption 1. QED. ￿
Proof of Theorem 2. Let e h(!;￿) ￿ 1 Ie ￿(￿)(!) ￿ h(!;￿). We ￿rst show that e h(!;￿) is log-
supermodular. We proceed by contradiction. Consider ! ￿ !0 and ￿ ￿ ￿0. Suppose that
e h(!;￿0)e h(!0;￿) > e h(!;￿)e h(!0;￿0). This implies ! 2 e ￿(￿0) and !0 2 e ￿(￿) with ! 6= !0 and
￿ 6= ￿0. Using Equation (7), we then get p(￿0)h(!;￿0) > p(￿)h(!;￿) and p(￿)h(!0;￿) >
p(￿0)h(!0;￿0). The 2 previous inequalities implies h(!;￿0)h(!0;￿) > h(!;￿)h(!0;￿0),
which contradicts Assumption 3. By Equations (3), (6), and (7), we have Q(￿;￿) =
R e h(!;￿)a(￿)f(!;￿)d!. We have just shown that that e h(!;￿) is log-supermodular. a(￿)
is trivially log-supermodular. By Assumption 2, we know that f (!;￿) is log-supermodular.
Theorem 2 derives from these 3 observations and the fact that log-supermodularity is pre-
served by multiplication and integration, by Lemmas 1 and 2. QED. ￿
Proof of Theorem 3. Theorem 2 shows that Assumptions 2 and 3 are su¢ cient conditions.
That they are a minimal pair is proved by 2 Lemmas.
Lemma 3. If Q(￿;￿) is log-supermodular in any F-economy where Assumption 3 holds,
then Assumption 2 holds.
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Inequality (14) implies ! 6= !0. Now consider a F-economy with 2 factors, ! and !0, 2
countries, with characteristics ￿ and ￿0, and 2 sectors, with characteristics ￿ > ￿0, such that
a(￿) = a(￿
0) = 1, (15)
h(!;￿) = h(!
0;￿
0) = 1, (16)
h(!;￿
0) = h(!
0;￿) = 0, (17)
which is possible since ! 6= !0 and ￿ 6= ￿0. Combining Equations (15), (16), and (17) with
Equations (3), (6), and (7) and Inequality (14), we get Q(￿;￿0)Q(￿0;￿) > Q(￿;￿)Q(￿0;￿0).
By Equations (16) and (17), Assumption 3 is satis￿ed. A contradiction. QED. ￿
Lemma 4. If Q(￿;￿) is log-supermodular in any F-economy where Assumption 2 holds,
then Assumption 3 holds.






Inequality (18) implies ! 6= !0, h(!;￿0) > 0, and h(!0;￿) > 0. This further implies the













h(!0;￿0) = +1 if h(!0;￿0) = 0. Now consider a F-economy with 2 factors, ! and !0, 2
countries, with characteristics ￿ > ￿0, and 2 sectors, with characteristics ￿ and ￿0, such that
prices satisfy Inequality (19) and
a(￿) = a(￿
0) = 1, (20)
f (!;￿) = f (!
0;￿
0) = 1, (21)
f (!;￿
0) = f (!
0;￿) = 0, (22)
which is possible since ! 6= !0 and ￿ 6= ￿0. Inequality (19) implies p(￿0)h(!;￿0) > p(￿)h(!;￿)
and p(￿)h(!0;￿) > p(￿0)h(!0;￿0). Combining these two inequalities with Equations (3), (6),
(7), (20), (21), and (22), we get Q(￿;￿0)Q(￿0;￿) > Q(￿;￿)Q(￿0;￿0). By Equations (21) and
(22), Assumption 2 is satis￿ed. A contradiction. QED. ￿28 ARNAUD COSTINOT
Proof of Theorem 4. We ￿rst show that if f (!;￿) is log-supermodular, strictly positive, and
log-concave in !, and t is increasing in ￿, then e f(!;￿) ￿ f [! ￿ t(￿);￿] is log-supermodular.
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there exist ! ￿ !0 and ￿ ￿ ￿0 such that
(23) f [!
0 ￿ t(￿);￿]f [! ￿ t(￿
0);￿




Since f is log-supermodular in (!;￿), we know that




0] ￿ f [!
0 ￿ t(￿
0);￿]f [! ￿ t(￿
0);￿
0].
Combining Inequalities (23) and (24) and the fact that f > 0, we get
(25) f [!
0 ￿ t(￿);￿]f [! ￿ t(￿
0);￿] > f [! ￿ t(￿);￿]f [!
0 ￿ t(￿
0);￿].
Since t is increasing in ￿, Inequality (25) implies that f (￿;￿) cannot be of Polya Frequency
of order 2, which contradicts f log-concave in !; see An (1998). At this point, we know that
aggregate output is given by Equations (7) and (9), that e f(!;￿) is log-supermodular, and
that h(!;￿) is log-supermodular by Assumption 2. Thus, we can invoke Theorem 2, which
implies Q(￿;￿) log-supermodular. QED. ￿
Proof of Theorem 5. We use the following Lemma.
Lemma 5. If q (!;￿;￿) satis￿es Assumption 4, then ￿(￿;￿c2) ￿ ￿(￿;￿c1) and ￿(￿;￿c1) ￿
￿(￿;￿c2) for any ￿c2 ￿ ￿c1.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that ￿ = ￿1. We only show that Assumption
4 implies ￿(￿;￿c2) ￿ ￿(￿;￿c1) for any ￿c2 ￿ ￿c1. The argument for ￿(￿;￿c1) ￿ ￿(￿;￿c2)
is similar. We proceed by contradiction. Take ! 2 ￿(￿;￿c2). By Equation (4), we have
p(￿)q(!;￿;￿c2) > maxs6=1 p(￿s)q(!;￿s;￿c2). Now suppose that ! = 2 ￿(￿;￿c1). By Equa-
tion (4), we also have maxs6=1 p(￿s)q(!;￿s;￿c1) > p(￿)q(!;￿;￿c1). Let s￿ ￿ argmaxs6=1
p(￿s)q(!;￿s;￿c1). Combining the two previous inequalities, we get q(!;￿;￿c2)q(!;￿s￿;￿c1) >
q(!;￿s￿;￿c2)q(!;￿;￿c1). Since ￿s￿ ￿ ￿ and ￿c2 ￿ ￿c1, this contradicts Assumption 4.
QED. ￿
Proof of Theorem 5 continued. Fix ￿c1 2 ￿ and de￿ne e Q(￿;￿) such that
(26) e Q(￿;￿) ￿
R
￿(￿;￿c1)q(!;￿;￿)f(!;￿)d￿(!),ELEMENTARY THEORY OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 29
for all ￿ 2 ￿ and ￿ 2 ￿. We can use the same reasoning as in Theorem 2 to show that
e Q(￿;￿) is log-supermodular. By Assumption 4, 1 I￿(￿;￿c1)(!) is log-supermodular in (!;￿).
By Assumptions 2 and 4, q(!;￿;￿) and f(!;￿) also are log-supermodular. Hence, e Q(￿;￿)
is log-supermodular by Lemmas 1 and 2, which implies
(27) e Q(￿;￿
c1) e Q(￿;￿
c2) ￿ e Q(￿;￿
c2) e Q(￿;￿
c1),
for any ￿c2 ￿ ￿c1. By Equation (26), we have e Q(￿;￿c1) = Q(￿;￿c1) and e Q(￿;￿c1) =
Q(￿;￿c1). Since q(!;￿;￿) ￿ 0 and f(!;￿) ￿ 0, we also have e Q(￿;￿c2) ￿ Q(￿;￿c2) and
Q(￿;￿c2) ￿ e Q(￿;￿c2) by Lemma 5. Combining the previous conditions with Inequality (27),
we get Q(￿;￿c1)Q(￿;￿c2) ￿ Q(￿;￿c2)Q(￿;￿c1) for any ￿c2 ￿ ￿c1. QED. ￿30 ARNAUD COSTINOT
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